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Executive Summary 
This research report provides a security assessment of the Softball Fields, Carroll 
Stadium, and the Natatorium Complex at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis 
(IUPUI). The purpose of this report is to prevent and mitigate harm to visitors and these facilities 
which resulting from human-made or natural disasters. Research is guided by the hypothesis that 
these facilities- due to their respective importance, locations, and attendance patterns are in 
harm’s way; and that certain strategies of prevention, protection, and mitigation coupled with 
effective preparedness, response, and recovery can lessen risk, improve security and provide 
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added resilience. Further, “harm’s way” is considered to be either a natural disaster or a human-
made disaster, accident, active provocation, or act of terrorism. Methods of analysis include 
applied research; predominantly utilizing qualitative data with some quantitative investigation.  
Results of this assessment illustrate that these venues possess numerous vulnerabilities to 
both natural and human-made threats that if exposed, could result in serious consequences. The 
two most likely natural hazards identified include straight-line winds and tornadoes. Further, the 
most likely human threats to these facilities arise from a potential terrorist vehicle attack (TVA) 
and an active shooter. This project also identifies a specific need for additional planning to 
prevent an IED or VBIED attack on the Natatorium.  
Common themes from the attached three case studies reveal that given theses 
vulnerabilities, the following safety and security adjustments are recommended: 
 Surveillance equipment 
 Metal detectors 
 Security bollards or other temporary barriers 
 Evacuation routes and shelter in place plans 
 Special event security procedures 
 Weather related technology and protocols 
 Staff training for emergency situations 
Introduction 
The Natatorium, Michael A. Carroll Stadium, and the NCAA softball fields are three 
sports facilities on the edge of Indiana University-Purdue University, Indianapolis campus which 
comprise a significant area of responsibility. All three facilities host a variety of high-profile 
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sporting events for high school, collegiate, professional, amateur, and Olympic purposes and 
have the combined capacity for seat 19,383 guests. 
These facilities face a wide range of safety and security threats, including unruly fans; 
alcohol consumption; drugs; unsupervised locker rooms; outdated technology; and staff that may 
be insufficiently prepared to respond to a significant emergency situation, due to the need for 
additional training and exercise. The facilities also face human-made and natural hazards that are 
less common than those listed above, but have substantially higher consequences should one of 
these situations arise. A security assessment of these three facilities was necessary in order to 
identify the most likely threats and vulnerabilities and to make recommendations for an 
improved security configuration that will improve resilience.  
This research is guided by the hypothesis that these facilities, due to their respective 
importance, locations, and attendance patterns, are in harm’s way. Certain strategies of 
prevention, protection, and mitigation coupled with effective preparedness, response, and 
recovery can lessen risk, improve security, and provide added resilience to each of the facilities. 
Furthermore, “harm’s way” is considered to be either a natural hazard or a human made disaster, 
accident, provocation, or act of terrorism. The methodological approach involves applied 
research employing mostly qualitative research with some quantitative examination. 
The remainder of this study addresses the vulnerabilities these facilities hold and the 
consequences of not adding additional protection. It also covers the most likely natural disasters, 
including straight-line winds and tornadoes, as well as the most likely terrorist events, including 
a terrorist vehicle attack (TVA), an active shooter, and an IED or VBIED attack. This is followed 
up with a discussion reviewing the common themes from the case study of each facility that can 
be applied to the area of responsibility as a whole. Finally, recommendations will be made for 
A THREAT ASSESSMENT AND SECURITY ANALYSIS 7 
 
tactics, techniques, and technology which could improve safety and security in the area of 
responsibility. 
Vulnerabilities and Consequences 
Prestigious Events 
        IUPUI is home to three sporting facilities that host events of significant importance. Hosting 
these events makes these three facilities potential targets for human-made disasters. Typically, 
terrorists target buildings or gatherings that produce the greatest payoff. Their goal is to target 
civilian populations to induce fear and foster distrust in current authorities to protect them. To 
accomplish this task, potential terrorists will often choose to attack open-access events and mass 
gatherings, such as marathons, sporting events, rallies, parades, and festivals (“First Responder’s 
Toolbox”, 2018).  
         The Natatorium is home to the NCAA Division One Swimming and Diving 
Championships, Olympic Diving Trials, Olympic Swimming Trials, IHSAA Swimming and 
Diving State Championships, and the US Swimming World Championship Trials. This facility 
can seat 4,700 people for one event. The Natatorium, as the venue for several Olympic trials and 
with its large seating capacity, is the most obvious potential target of a terrorist attack of the 
three facilities on IUPUI campus.  
            The NCAA softball fields were built in preparation for the 1987 Pan American games 
and hosts the NCAA Division One IUPUI Jaguars home softball games and annual Fall 
Tournament (“IUPUI Softball”, 2019). The complex has also featured a variety of other 
prestigious events over the last 20 years (“IUPUI Softball”, 2019). With a seating capacity of 
over 2,500 people, the softball fields have the ability to draw quite a crowd of spectators. As a 
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primarily outdoor facility, however, the gathered crowds are exposed to a large, wide open area 
with little cover or shelter that is readily available in the event of an emergency. 
         Carroll Stadium has by far the most seating capacity of the three sports facilities with a 
capability of hosting 12,183 visitors including the media box (“About”, 2019). This stadium has 
a long history of hosting major national and international events, including Olympic Trials and 
Indy Eleven professional soccer; and it was built with the dream of making Indianapolis the 
“Amateur Sports Capital of the World” (“Michael A. Carroll Track”, 2019). The combination of 
hosting the famed Olympic Trials and professional soccer games (a sport that is extremely 
popular all around the world) makes Carroll Stadium a prime target for human-made attacks. 
 Sporting events have a long history of being targets of violence (Lee, 2013) In the past, 
terrorists have often chosen to display their anger and violence to the world through attacking 
Olympic games and trials, World Cup games, and marathons (Lee, 2013). Altogether, these three 
sporting facilities, located next to each other in the same area of campus, host major national and 
international events, Olympic trial games, and local sporting events; and were built with the 
grand intentions of making the state of Indiana the amateur sports center of the world. This 
means that not only do these locations host events of consequence, but they are also symbolic 
because to the image of the entire state. This combination of fame, large crowds, location, and 
big dreams puts these facilities at a heightened risk to experience potential terrorist attacks in the 
future. 
Location of Sporting Facilities 
The IUPUI NCAA softball fields, Carroll Stadium, and the Natatorium are all three 
located on the southern side West New York Street. This location puts all three sports facilities 
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on the southern edge of campus on the border with the White River, meaning that all three 
facilities are somewhat isolated in regards to response efforts. All first response agencies and 
personnel must come from the north or from New York Street when they are responding to 
emergencies or situations. This leaves few viable options to respond to a disaster and establishes 
West New York Street as an extremely important factor in accessing these facilities. 
Emergency evacuation from any of these buildings will have to begin on New York 
Street initially. The vast majority of available parking is located to the north of the facilities with 
a couple of additional options to the east of Carroll Stadium, meaning that all fleeing attendees 
will be heading north and east from the soccer stadium and softball fields. This makes evacuation 
from these two facilities especially dangerous because everyone is fleeing in the same directions. 
This situation produces several important high consequence vulnerabilities to visitors attending 
events at these facilities: 
 
 Dense crowds without provocation present a danger due to possible trampling, 
building of aggression, surging, rushing, or crushing people between each other or 
objects (“Dangers of a Crowd”, 2017).  
 The large groups that have gathered will be particularly susceptible to human-
made threats, such as active shooter, VTA, and IED attacks.  
 As people flee or leave an event, they are naturally funneled into the same 
direction. This makes an attack or a secondary attack easier for terrorists because 
they already know the direction in which all spectators and attendees will flee the 
sporting venues.  
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 Secondary attacks that purposefully target first responders are a heightened risk 
factor because an initial attack will send everyone in the same, predictable 
direction. After attacking the facility initially, setting up a secondary one for 
fleeing attendees will take no skill and little intensive planning. 
Parking at the Natatorium presents less of an issue because the building has a parking lot 
or garage on three sides and an additional lot available to the immediate northwest. It is ideal to 
have people leaving the facility in different directions to prevent harm. 
The problem for all facilities, however, is that all traffic must either utilize or cross New 
York Street. If this road is closed down or the threat comes from New York Street, there is 
nowhere for visitors in vehicles to evacuate or leave safely. Attendees may be trapped with the 
White River at their backs and to the west, with the only available option in that direction being 
the New York Street bridge crossing over the river. Any damage to, or threat on, this bridge cuts 
off another entire escape route for visitors and response routes for emergency personnel. While 
there are multiple side streets that run north and south, they all connect to the same three streets, 
including: New York Street, Vermont Street, and Michigan Street. This gives fleeing attendees 
few options and traffic will back up horribly, creating a whole new hazard.  
Lack of Accessible Indoor Shelter 
         The NCAA softball fields and Carroll Stadium are both primarily outdoor facilities. They 
are both surrounded by each other, open fields, and open parking lots. The nearest indoor shelter 
for these two facilities is the Natatorium and if this is not available for whatever reason, then the 
next options are the National Institute for Fitness and Sport and the School of Social Work. Both 
of these buildings are some distance away.  
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They also may be locked in times of distress. Any event that would require attendees to shelter in 
place or seek indoor shelter would cause a serious problem for these two facilities in particular. 
Warnings and decisions would need to be made quickly in order to give people enough time to 
make it to these buildings or seek other shelter. Hesitation or the inability to make a decision 
would devastating because people would be caught out in the elements. 
         The Natatorium, on the other hand, can shelter a large number of people inside the 
facility. If the people inside needed to flee to another building, the Natatorium connects to the 
School of Social Work with a Skywalk tunnel. The School of Social Work is also directly north 
of the Natatorium so people can also flee outside instead of taking the tunnel. Nearby are also the 
Herron School of Art and the National Institute for Fitness and Sport so visitors attending an 
event at the Natatorium have more options to shelter indoors than those attending events at the 
softball complex or Carroll Stadium. Parking garages could also be used. 
Most Likely Natural Hazards 
Thunderstorms, Straight-Line Winds, and Tornadoes 
Straight-line wind is defined as any wind produced by a thunderstorm that is not 
associated with rotation and is classified as damaging once wind speeds reach 50-60 MPH 
(“Severe Weather 101”, n.d.). Wind damage from severe thunderstorms is the most common 
type of weather-related damage in the lower 48 states, accounting for half of all weather-related 
damage reports (“Severe Weather 101”, n.d.). This makes damage caused by straight-line winds 
more common than damage resulting from tornadoes (“Severe Weather 101”, n.d.). 
Carroll Stadium and the Natatorium are both known to host events year round while the 
NCAA softball fields hold the vast majority of their events in the spring. For the year 2019, the 
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Natatorium has already experienced the most dense months of scheduled sporting events 
between January and March, but it continues to hold a variety of competitions, leagues, 
invitationals, and sectionals throughout the rest of the year (“2019 IU Natatorium Events”, 
2018). The busiest times of the year for Carroll Stadium are the spring and fall, when most of the 
featured games showcase Indy Eleven professional soccer games, however the stadium also 
plays host to many other shows, festivals, and other events (“Michael A. Carroll Stadium”, 
2019).  In the summertime, Carroll Stadium tends to host several marathons every year 
(“Michael A. Carroll Stadium”, 2019). The 2019 softball season is scheduled between February 
8 and May 4th, making the main season for the NCAA softball fields the spring (“2018-2019 
Softball Schedule”, 2019). 
         According to these schedules, the vast majority of events, games, marathons, and 
festivals occur in the spring. According to Climate Central (2015), spring is the peak of the 
severe weather season every year. This is because the atmosphere is warming from the cold of 
wintertime and the rise in temperature creates the perfect environment for thunderstorms that 
produce damaging winds, hail, lightning, and tornadoes (Climate Central, 2015). Since this is 
also the busy season for all three sports facilities on campus, the natural hazard threat to each 
facility is substantially heightened. Carroll Stadium and the NCAA softball fields are at the most 
risk in the case of weather-related difficulties because both facilities are primarily outdoors. The 
Natatorium is still at risk to experiencing weather damage and other related issues, however it is 
an indoor facility. 
In the event of a damaging storm with high winds, the softball fields and soccer/track 
complex are more likely to experience injury to people or loss of life if proper precautions are 
overlooked due to the outdoor nature of the two facilities. Secondary to the threat to human 
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welfare is the damage the facilities themselves will suffer in the event of inclement weather. The 
Natatorium, being an indoors facility, is more likely to experience property damage during a 
thunderstorm with damaging winds or hail than injury or loss of life. All three facilities, 
however, are at heightened risk to experience loss of life, injury, and property damage in the 
event of a tornado. Urban tornadoes are rare, but Nashville, TN had one in both 1998 and 2006. 
Most Likely Terrorist Threats 
Terrorist Vehicular Attack (TVA) 
         G4S Corporate Risk Services recommends that authorities consider vehicle ramming as a 
legitimate threat when planning for a special event (“Vehicular Terrorism”, 2017). Terrorists are 
relying more on low tech, low sophistication methods to attack crowds because they are more 
difficult for police to detect or intervene (“Vehicles as Weapons of Terror”, 2019). A vehicular 
attack is one of the easiest types of attacks because it requires little to no planning, no particular 
skill, and is versatile enough to fit almost any situation (“Vehicular Terrorism”, 2017). New 
York Street runs through the length of the south side of campus past all three sports facilities. 
Having these facilities in the same location and on the same street makes them particularly 
vulnerable to terrorists targeting civilians and intending to inflict mass casualties with a vehicle. 
Internet sources that are designed to give terrorists motivation and ideas specifically 
encourage attacking sports venues, entertainment events, and shopping centers (“Vehicular 
Terrorism”, 2017). These same readily accessible sources also encourage terrorists to utilize 
vehicles in their attacks because they can inflict casualties even without access to explosives, 
firearms, or other weapons (“Vehicular Terrorism”, 2017). They can also be used to target 
crowds, buildings, and other vehicles (“Vehicular Terrorism”, 2017). Due to the versatility and 
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ease of use of a vehicle as a weapon, and the convenient location of three major event venues in 
the same place on campus, a TVA against the sports facilities has a high likelihood and should be 
included in the plans and preparations of security for all three facilities.       
Active Shooter 
The threat of an active shooter on a university campus is not new. This became a central 
issue to university security in 2007, when a student opened fire on Virginia Tech campus, killing 
32 people and, ultimately, himself (Roman, 2018). The active shooter threat has become 
heightened since that time, with 250 such attacks occurring between the years 2000-2017 
(Roman, 2018). Of these attacks, 15 took place on college campuses (Roman, 2018). 
The type of the venues evaluated in this study causes them to be at risk to an active 
shooter by their very nature. Each complex draws large crowds and can seat thousands of 
spectators. They are historically associated with Olympic Games and trials, professional and 
amateur sports, marathons, and other spotlight events. Active shooter attacks require crowds in 
order to be a successful (“Vehicular Terrorism”, 2017). The size and prestige of the events held 
at all three sports facilities on campus, combined with the fact that they are all in the same place, 
makes them an exceptionally prime target for an active shooter. 
A terrorist could find a list of featured events online and determine if two or more are 
held at the same time and plan their attack around that information. By simply looking at the 
scheduling, a motivated terrorist could pick the perfect time to plan out an attack to inflict mass 
casualties. Due to these unique circumstances, the NCAA softball fields, Carroll Stadium, and 
the Natatorium all have an elevated risk of experiencing an active shooter situation. 
Most Vulnerable Facility of Consequence 
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The Natatorium 
The Indiana University Natatorium is the most significant sports complex at IUPUI. 
Being an Olympic style venue hosting large scale events including the NCAA Division 1 
Swimming and Diving Championships, Olympic Diving and Swimming Trials, USA Swimming 
World Championships, and a multitude of other large-scale sporting events, this venue is 
considered to be of the most consequence from a safety and security standpoint; with 4,700 
seating capacity. Additional specifics for this venue can be found in its respective case study 
attached to the end of this document. With the Natatorium being the home for national events 
that attract global attention, acts of terrorism become a critical component of the planning and 
prevention process being discussed. More specifically, an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) or 
a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) present the largest threat to life and 
property when specifically referring to this venue.  
 With the Natatorium being open to the public and centrally located at IUPUI, the threat of 
an IED (Improvised Explosive Device) becomes even more prominent. This venue should be 
considered a soft target in its current state due to the open accessibility in relation to the number 
of spectators concentrated in a confined area during the peak times of an event. The current 
ideologies of various, mainstream terrorist organizations can lead us to assume that an attack 
carried out by an IED would occur in the main seating area or entrance hall of the venue, as 
during an event with full capacity, but all spectators would likely be concentrated in either area 
which increases the likelihood of an attack being one of mass casualty. To prevent an IED from 
being used against a full Natatorium, the issue lies in preventing the bomb from compromising 
security measures and making it to the main spectator areas. 
A THREAT ASSESSMENT AND SECURITY ANALYSIS 16 
 
 Improved security measures can be implemented at the Natatorium that would serve to 
harden the target against foreign or domestic terrorist organizations thus mitigating the threat of 
an IED attack. In an article written by Mark Lang, restricting access points to a large, soft target 
such as the Natatorium is cited as one of the most effective solutions for hardening a large venue 
(Lang, 2017). The main entrance points in the Natatorium are located at the east and west end of 
the building. Individuals can enter through these entrances and then access the main spectator 
area through other unmonitored access points within the venue. Restricting hallway and locker 
room doors in addition to side entrances forces all individuals to access the venue through two 
main points of entry, streamlining security efforts. Partnering with private contracted security 
companies as well as using the Indiana University Police Department to guard these access 
points can improve security. Through the use of armed or unarmed personnel, ensuring 
unauthorized individuals do not have access to the spectator area, is an important consideration. 
Creating a choke point for spectators through the east and west doors allows for better 
monitoring of people entering is a must. As seen in the Boston Marathon Bombing, an attacker 
with an IED will likely have it in a pack or bag they are carrying. Implementing the use of walk-
through metal detectors at these two points would require each individual entering the venue to 
be screened cleared of any Improvised Explosive Device, while not compromising the demand 
for efficient ingress or line management. The entrance points must also include an armed 
security presence by the Indiana University Police Department or other neighboring agencies, 
such as the Indiana State Police or Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department. This presence 
will act as a deterrent for any malicious actors attempting to enter the venue.  
 Another common approach taken by terrorist organizations is ensuring the IED is in place 
before the start of the event, allowing a malicious actor to bypass security measures implemented 
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at the start of the event. This threat is complex in nature, as the Natatorium is not monitored with 
24/7 security personnel, and thus will be hard to mitigate. Addressing this threat is best done 
through a partnership with either the Indiana University Police Department or Indianapolis 
Metropolitan Police Department. Both of these agencies possess canine programs that have the 
capability of detecting an Improvised Explosive Device. With an event at the Natatorium that is 
expected to attract significant crowds of national recognition, a bomb certified canine could be 
taken throughout the venue to detect the presence of an IED set in place before the influx of 
spectators. Both approaches to this problem harden the target and could prevent a mass casualty 
incident from occurring at the IU Natatorium. The partnership between IUPD or IMPD and their 
canine programs segues into prevention efforts. 
 As also highlighted in its respective case study later, the IU Natatorium is located on the 
southeast corner of New York Street and University Boulevard. It could be assumed that an 
attack via a VBIED would likely occur directly west of the venue on University Boulevard, the 
Sports Parking Garage that is attached to the venue on the east, or on Blake Street, which is 
located on the south end of the Natatorium. All three locations directly border the venue, making 
them ideal locations for a vehicle attack. As we saw in the Oklahoma City Bombing, a truck or 
car containing a VBIED needs to be in close proximity to the target to have the largest effect, 
making these points the main areas of interest. While these attacks are preventable, they pose a 
more complex concern from a safety and security standpoint due to the public’s ability to freely 
access these roads.  
 Activating a partnership between a canine program and the security personnel at the 
venue would allow for the early detection of a VBIED. This approach would produce the best 
results if, during a national or global event, access was restricted from New York Street onto 
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both University Boulevard and Blake Street. Restricting these access points allows the security 
staff to more effectively monitor vehicles coming onto these streets. As they monitor the 
vehicles, any large trucks or vans (as determined by a Standard Operating Procedure) would be 
searched using a bomb detecting canine before access is granted near the Natatorium. In order to 
ensure unauthorized vehicles do not compromise security efforts, solid barricades should be 
erected at New York/University and New York/Blake, thus forcing any traffic coming off of 
New York Street to be monitored for a potential VBIED. Solid barriers are inexpensive to obtain 
and would not likely require future budgetary attention. Having roads that can be accessed by the 
public surrounding the venue increases the level of prevention complexity; however, restricting 
access to authorized personnel only and closely monitoring the contents of larger vehicles that 
have the capability to carry a large VIED, is one option. Others are in the case study. 
 
Common Themes 
Attention should be paid to the three attached case studies which look at the specifics of 
mitigation for each venue. All three venues present three common themes which can be applied 
to the main area of responsibility (AOR). These are; open accessibility in constrained space, 
major disaster evacuation planning needs, and improved technology and surveillance. The case 
studies provide specific recommendations.  
 The first theme is relatively open accessibility in constricted space. All three sites are 
located in close proximity one to another on the south side of New York Street, thus establishing 
them as a “wall of security considerations,” and in close as well to the other significant campus 
buildings. Those include University Hall, the Campus Center and Lecture Hall. This open 
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accessibility presents a multitude of challenges from a security standpoint, as it presents a row of 
inherent “soft-targets” until modified. Two of these facilities present fencing, though chiefly for 
crowd control. This fencing should be improved with portable barriers to lessen access from 
terrorists during heavy usage events. As all three venues are accessible at some point along New 
York Street, and the major barrier technology which is recommended are bollards. Preferably in 
the form of retracting bollards, implementing this acts as a restriction from road access points 
that can be erected at any given place during an event, addressing concerns of a TVA or 
VBIEDs. 
Second an overall evacuation plan for the entire area of responsibility is recommended. 
As highlighted in the case studies, although each venue has an evacuation plan, each venue lacks 
an overall evacuation plan for the entire area ---should a major disaster or crisis impact all three 
venues at once. Individual venue evacuation plans should be developed to include provisions for 
simultaneous multiple venue evacuation. Case studies address particular tactics, techniques, and 
technology which could be implemented. This would ultimately conclude, creating an evacuation 
plan which guides spectators out to main points of egress, safely and speedily.  
 Finally, improved surveillance equipment should be provided for all three venues and 
improvements to inclement weather technology should be made.  Too many vehicles and too 
many people, some with back packs, regularly get in with reasonable ease. Natural disasters pose 
a notably significant threat to the entire area. Because the same types of natural threats pose a 
threat to all the venues, one technology can improve the security of the entire area here. By using 
specialized weather instruments discussed in the case studies, weather monitoring for the entire 
area can be improved.  
A THREAT ASSESSMENT AND SECURITY ANALYSIS 20 
 
 The three common themes complied from each case study should allow IUPUI to draft 
preparedness plans which can be implemented for the “whole community” and tailored to the 
specific venue. As mentioned, each venue’s respective case study includes specific information 
regarding this.  
Conclusion 
            The particular importance, locations, and attendance patterns of the Natatorium, Carroll 
Stadium, and the Softball Fields require strategies of prevention, protection, and mitigation 
coupled with effective preparedness, response, and recovery. The expected result is risk 
reduction, improvement of security, and added resilience.  The application of these 
recommendations has the potential to improve the overall safety and security of this area of 
responsibility and the IUPUI campus as a whole; by reducing the potential for events that cause 
injury, death, and extensive structural damage. 
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Case Study One: NCAA Softball Fields 
Abstract 
The Indiana University-Purdue University, Indianapolis (IUPUI) NCAA Softball Fields were 
built in preparation for the 1987 Pan American games, feature every IUPUI home softball game, 
and have hosted a wide variety of other prominent events over the last twenty years (“IUPUI 
Softball”, 2019). Combining permanent and temporary seating and standing room, the NCAA 
softball fields at IUPUI have the capacity to accommodate over 2,500 people for a single event 
(“IUPUI Softball”, 2019). A large sports facility that houses many large events every year has 
many potential risks and vulnerabilities. Techniques, technology, and other equipment can be 
utilized to enhance the facility’s security during events. Hall (2006) emphasizes the necessary 
steps university sports programs must take to secure their stadiums and campuses against 
potential threats. The planning process for securing a major sporting facility involves compliance 
and coordination from staff along with various local, state, and private agencies. 
The goal of this case study is to develop effective mitigation and response strategies aimed at 
reducing the risk of potential natural hazards and man-made threats. First, an outline of the 
situation will be presented. Then, there will be a detailed review of the challenges and issues. 
This will be followed by a list of current actions and finally, the recommended changes and 
conclusion. 
         Keywords: security, technology, preparedness, planning process, mitigation, all hazards, 
response, terrorist vehicular attack, terrorist, natural hazards, active shooter, tornados, straight-
line winds 
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Situation 
The NCAA softball fields, located in downtown Indianapolis, Indiana (Marion County), 
are home to division one softball competitions for the IUPUI Jaguars. The complex itself is 
located close to the corner of West New York Street and Barnhill Drive. The White River runs 
along the south side of the complex. Located to the east is the Carroll Stadium soccer fields and 
track. There are practice softball fields on the west side of the complex and to the north resides 
the Vermont Street and Caldwell Street parking lots. 
  The high visibility of events associated with the softball fields combined with the high 
attendance produces the need for enhanced security protocols. This security review will 
encompass potential natural hazards and man-made threats, making it an all-hazards approach to 
securing the softball fields at IUPUI. The natural disasters discussed include tornadoes, straight-
line winds, and thunderstorms. The man-made threats discussed in this article include terrorist 
vehicular attack (TVA) and active shooter.  
Having a detailed plan in place for each of these possibilities allows first responders to 
react to any situation, save lives, and ensure efficient communications and agency 
interoperability. Implementing an all-hazards approach and preparing for the worst-case scenario 
allows for a tailored and scalable response to any unexpected incident. A good plan defines the 
roles and responsibilities of all relevant stakeholders in the safety and security of the NCAA 
softball complex on IUPUI campus.  
Challenges and Issues 
The softball complex has several vulnerabilities that need to be considered and remedied. 
In the State of Indiana, there is the potential for a multitude of natural hazards. The current 2019 
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Softball Season begins on February 8th and ends on May 4th (“IUPUI Softball”, 2019). This 
means that the facility is subject to all of the spring season natural weather events that are 
common to the region. To be prepared, the Softball Complex needs to implement an all-hazards 
methodology to its preparedness and response efforts. 
Natural Hazards 
Tornadoes: According to data from the National Weather Service, Marion County alone 
experienced four tornadoes between 2012 and 2016 (“Marion County”, n.d.). This data 
demonstrates that IUPUI can expect one tornado per year on average. Two of the four tornadoes 
experienced within this time frame struck during the springtime; therefore, there is a moderate 
risk of one occurring during softball season (“Marion County”, n.d.). A tornado would be most 
devastating if it were to touch down in flatlands such as the practice softball fields, where there is 
no shelter. In this case, evacuation would be risky and dangerous because it would further place 
attendees and athletes in harm’s way while they flee the ensuing weather across a wide, open 
expanse of land. Having a detailed response plan in effect for an event such as this could save 
lives and protect the university from potential litigation. 
Straight-line Winds: Straight-line winds can produce intensely damaging winds that 
travel in the direction of the storm front. These winds can be commonly associated with either 
the front or down burst caused by a thunderstorm (“Severe Weather Awareness”, n.d.). At their 
most damaging, straight-line winds can reach gust speeds of up to 130 mph, have sustained 
winds up to 58 mph, and can last for well over 10 minutes (“Severe Weather Awareness”, n.d.). 
In the U.S., these weather events are most common during the spring when weather instability is 
typically the highest. This makes straight-line winds an increased threat to the IUPUI Softball 
Complex since its main sporting season is the spring. Preparedness planning for strong winds 
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such as a tornado or windstorm needs to be taken seriously because these are the most likely 
natural hazards to impact the softball complex and because simply asking the attendees to leave 
would only increase the risk to their lives. 
Rain and Thunderstorms: During the spring and summer months in Indiana, 
thunderstorms can be dangerous and appear suddenly with little to no warning. Thunderstorms 
can produce heavy rain, lightning, strong winds, tornadoes, and potentially hail 
(“Thunderstorms”, 2019). These particular weather events pose a significant threat to the NCAA 
Softball Fields due to its seasonal existence. Some thunderstorms have the strength to cause 
power outages, electrical damage, and severe damage to infrastructure. The middle stage of a 
thunderstorm is typically the most dangerous; therefore it is crucial to act immediately upon 
initial warnings signs (“Thunderstorms”, 2019). The Indiana Department of Homeland Security 
recommends the following tips to ensure one's safety during a thunderstorm (“Thunderstorms”, 
2019): 
 Avoid large open areas. 
 Avoid taking shelter near water. (This is particularly important because the White River 
runs along the southern edge of the softball fields.) 
 Be familiar with the area and alternate evacuation routes. 
 Avoid metal objects and electrical wires. 
 Avoid underpasses. 
 If evacuation is necessary, seek the nearest indoor shelter. 
 If a thunderstorm is expected, the safest precautions are cancelling or postponing the 
event. 
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Man-Made Threats 
Active Shooter, Terrorist Vehicular Attack (TVA), and Improvised Explosive 
Device (IED): White River Trail runs along the southern border of the NCAA Softball Complex. 
Between the White River Trail and the softball fields is a chain link fence with multiple gates 
that are only secured by a padlock. These gates lead directly to the softball complex. There are 
no apparent security measures beyond the padlocks on the gates at these locations. This makes 
them vulnerable to terrorist threats or an active shooter event. One gate opens up south of the 
easternmost field and a second gate is located by the practice field that is behind home plate on 
the main field. The potential attacker(s) would have access to an area overlooking a majority of 
the lower seating. The field also sits below ground level on the south side, which could be 
dangerous in the event of an active shooter or other types of non-vehicular terrorist attacks, such 
as the placement of an improvised explosive device (IED). 
On the north side of the softball fields, adjacent to New York Street, the main gate seems 
to be the most vulnerable for several types of attacks. The entrance is wide enough for vehicles 
to drive through and has no barrier to prevent one from entering the facility. There is also a gate 
just north of the left field foul pole that is only secured by a padlock. Overall, this is not an ideal 
place for someone to enter the facility because they are exposed to higher traffic, but it is still a 
vulnerable location for an attack to occur. The east side of the NCAA Softball Complex shares 
an entrance with Carroll Stadium and there is no permanent barrier separating the softball fields 
from the soccer stadium. The gate on the north side of the main softball field is also less likely to 
be vulnerable to covert terror attacks such as the placement of an IED, but may be more 
vulnerable to an active shooter, TVA, or suicide bomber due to the heavy pedestrian traffic near 
the gate and on West New York Street. 
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Chemical, Radiological, or Biological Threats: New York Street also has multiple side 
roads connecting to it in the vicinity of the softball fields. In the event of an attack or accident 
that causes harmful materials exposure on New York Street or a side street, the softball field is at 
risk of its occupants being exposed to the harmful material. The same is true of the White River 
Trail running behind the softball fields; a harmful material could be released behind the fields, 
exposing those inside the softball complex to a hazardous or harmful substance. The main 
entrance of the softball fields remains a weak point where an individual could drive a vehicle 
into the facility and then attempt to expose the occupants to whatever materials they choose to 
release. 
Current Actions 
The IUPUI Softball Complex is located on campus south of West New York Street. The 
complex includes three adjacent fields, highlighted by Field 2 at the main entrance of the 
compound (“IUPUI Softball”, 2019). Field 2 is known for hosting IUPUI's Fall Softball 
Tournament during five of the past six years. The interior of Field 2 consists of a grass playing 
surface and a temporary boundary inside the main fence (“IUPUI Softball”, 2019). The facility's 
unique layout includes concrete dugouts along both baselines that are built below the playing 
surface (“IUPUI Softball”, 2019). Recently, a wireless nine-inning scoreboard was installed 
outside of the centerfield fence (“IUPUI Softball”, 2019). There are construction plans in place 
to build a press box behind the home plate within the next few years (“IUPUI Softball”, 2019). 
Recommended Results and Changes 
Mitigation. The planning process of reducing potential hazards and threats includes a 
collective effort from the university's sports program, IUPUI police department, and local and 
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state agencies. The following measures can be taken to improve security before holding a 
sporting event at the IUPUI NCAA softball complex: 
 Annual emergency response drills should be held and should include all necessary first 
response agencies. These drills will ensure interoperability and delineate all roles, 
responsibilities, operating procedures, and expectations of each agency in an emergency. 
This also helps combat staff complacency by training them in the importance of their 
tasks. 
 Install indoor and outdoor surveillance equipment. 
o A brief standard for this equipment includes: weatherproof and vandal proof, 
indoor/outdoor capability, 4k resolution, playback capability, 24-7 recording, 
zoom, infrared, and motion sensors. 
 Adding security bollards to West New York Street and more temporary water or sand 
fillable plastic barriers to Beauty Avenue and Barnhill Drive. 
 Create a detailed evacuation plan. We recommend West New York Street onto Lansing, 
West New York Street onto Limestone Street, West New York Street onto Barnhill 
Drive, and West New York Street heading over the White River. 
 A plan to relocate attendees in the event of an emergency and indoor shelter is necessary. 
 The incident commander should have communication and information networks in place 
to gain the best knowledge in order to make timely, well-informed decisions. 
 Event staff need to have access to current live Doppler radar to assess weather patterns 
and lightning strikes. 
 Incorporate the IUPUI text, phone call, and email warning system to warn about severe 
weather warnings, watches, and event cancellation. 
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 Either an emergency response vehicle or a temporary water or sand fillable barrier needs 
to be placed in front of the main gate to the softball facilities to prevent a potential TVA. 
 Ensure lightning rods are placed in relevant locations around the softball fields to 
mitigate the effects of a thunderstorm. 
 Place cameras and/or alarms around the gates on the southern border of the softball 
complex. This will alert event security if someone crosses over the fence, tampers with a 
padlock, or tampers with the fence. 
 A drone with video camera capability can be used before and during events to monitor 
the large area that is the main softball field, practice fields, audience seating area, and all 
entrances, exits, and fences. 
 Ensure all camera footage feeds back to a single, central location with constant 
monitoring before and during large events. Camera footage should also be recorded via 
DVR. 
Response Strategies. In the event of a natural disaster or terrorist event, the actions taken in 
the initial minutes are crucial. It is absolutely critical that all responding agencies and personnel 
know their roles, responsibilities, and standard protocols for every possibility. The following 
response strategies can be made to improve security during events held at the IUPUI NCAA 
softball fields: 
 Security inspections of the facilities, perimeter, and parking facilities need to be 
conducted before any event. We also suggest periodic sweeps during the game, especially 
before the event ends and people begin to leave the premises. K9 units are especially 
crucial to these sweeps. 
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 Periodic security checkpoints throughout the area to check bags. We also recommend a 
limit to the number of bags allowed per person and suggest advertising encouraging the 
use of clear or transparent bags for faster processing. 
 Shut down nearby streets to serve as a buffer zone to the event as well as to allow 
emergency vehicles and first responders expedient access to the softball fields. 
 Add plainclothes police officers to the crowd for quick emergency response and 
additional surveillance. 
 Improve communications systems and interoperability between all responding agencies, 
including IUPD, IMPD, IEMS, IFD, MCSO and MECA. Utilizing a unique event 
channel via dispatch is also advisable to have each agency on the same frequency. 
Conclusion 
Overall, the IUPUI NCAA Softball Complex presents a unique challenge to sporting 
event security because it entails a wide, open expanse of land that is exposed to the elements and 
particularly vulnerable to man-made threats due to its somewhat isolated location. It is 
imperative that IUPUI is quick and willing when deciding to cancel sporting events held at the 
softball fields in the incidence of inclement weather or threats against the event, school, or 
surrounding area. It is critical that event staff remain up to date on the latest weather predictions 
and patterns to prevent potential tragedies, such as the 2011 Indiana State Fair stage collapse. 
Cancellations should be broadcast and advertised liberally to ensure the news spreads to fans, 
spectators, and athletes. 
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Case Study Two: Carroll Stadium 
 Situation & Current Actions 
The Michael A. Carroll Track and Soccer Stadium was built in 1982 and is located on the 
southwest corner of the IUPUI campus at 1001 West New York Street, Indianapolis, Indiana. 
The stadium currently accommodates seating for 12,111 guests and includes a press box capable 
of seating up to 72 media representatives (“About”, 2019). The stadium was developed in hopes 
of making Indianapolis the “Amateur Sports Capital of the World” (“Michael A. Carroll Track”, 
2019). Carroll Stadium has a long history of hosting major, prestigious national and international 
events including Olympic Team Trials. In addition to the numerous special events hosted at 
Carroll Stadium, it is the full-time home to IUPUI men’s and women’s soccer and track 
programs. Carroll Stadium was also the home of the Indy Eleven professional soccer team until 
2018 (“Michael”, n.d.). 
Challenges and Issues 
Terrorist Threats 
Terrorist threats are perpetrated by both foreign and domestic organizations and 
individuals in the modern post 9/11 United States. Terrorist threats tend to indicate that an attack 
is imminent, and indications vary from site surveillance detected by local security to chatter on 
social media sites (CITE). There are also terrorist attacks that have occurred without any 
indicators, which forces first responders to catch up in establishing situational awareness and 
relevant tasking. Two specific types of terrorist attacks that can cause serious physical and 
psychological damage are vehicular attack and active shooter. Vehicular attacks have proven to 
be devastating and extremely difficult to detect and respond to. The Counter Extremism Project 
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is an international nonprofit organization that tracks extremist attacks worldwide, and they have 
documented 40 vehicular attacks since 2006 (“Counter Extremism”, n.d.). These attacks have 
been committed by individuals that are called upon by large networks such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, 
and Hamas. A recent example of this was the attack in New York City by Sayfullo Habibullaevic 
Saipov. Saipov utilized a rented Home Depot truck to strike runners and cyclists on the West 
Side Highway (Prokupecz, Levenson, & Gingras, 2017). This attack resulted in New York City 
creating an additional 1500 barriers to protect pedestrians from vehicular attacks (Allen, 2018). 
           Active shooter situations are another type of threat that is hard to combat. There are 
several examples of active shooters on college campuses, the most notable example being the 
2007 Virginia Tech shooting which claimed 32 lives (Rock, 2019). There have also been active 
shooter situations at religious establishments, concerts, and more parallel to this research, a 
congressional softball game. James Hodgkinson open fired during the Republican Caucus 
softball practice seriously wounding Representative Steve Scalise (Shear, Goldman, & Cochrane, 
2017). Capital Police and Alexandria Police were on site at the time, and they were able to 
immediately thwart the attack and neutralize the assailant before more damage was done. These 
two types of attacks are arguably the hardest to counter without proper physical deterrents such 
as barriers and armed security on site during events. Proper response also requires the 
establishment and practice of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that cover topics such as 
initial reaction, communication, chain of command, egress routes, rally points, and the roles and 
responsibilities of all stakeholders. 
Natural Hazards 
The establishment and practice of protocols for the natural hazards that regularly impact 
Indiana such as tornadoes, straight line winds, and floods should also be considered a high 
A THREAT ASSESSMENT AND SECURITY ANALYSIS 35 
 
priority. The open-air layout of Carroll Stadium puts occupants at risk of being exposed to these 
threats. Many challenges are faced when it comes to natural hazards and this venue. These 
challenges include: lack of severe weather communication, minimal shelter, no clear evacuation 
plan, and little time to evacuate a large amount of people after the official tornado warning. 
Severe weather notifications used today are broadcast over radio or television using the 
NOAA Weather Radio, broadcast over sirens, and through the utilization of the Live Doppler 
Radar which assists in tracking the movement of severe and inclement weather (“Tornadoes”, 
2011). There’s a general requirement for patrons to be within earshot of sirens, near a television 
or radio, have the mechanism set up on a cellular device, or to be actively monitoring Doppler 
radar for any of these notification methods to be effective. There’s a method of communication 
currently being utilized on IUPUI’s campus during security driven events such as armed 
robberies, assaults, and rapes which sends out texts and calls to students’ phones to alert them of 
the situation. However, this technology is not being applied during severe weather situations that 
would impact events at the stadium. Thus, challenges faced with communication are a lack of 
widespread, easily heard, and well-known sources of information during a natural disaster or 
severe weather. If students, attendees, faculty, and staff are not aware of where warning 
information should be coming from or cannot be readily reached with available technology, the 
health and safety of anyone attending an event at an open setting like Carroll Stadium are at risk. 
Evacuation is an additional challenge for Carroll Stadium. The current average lead time 
for tornado warnings is 13 minutes according to the NOAA (“Tornadoes”, 2011). This is a 
limited amount of time to evacuate a large crowd. While Carroll Stadium does have locker 
rooms, they are not sizeable enough to hold all occupants with the stadium at maximum capacity 
in addition to any surrounding pedestrians. Evacuation routes to the Natatorium, the safer of the 
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two structures nearby, are not explicitly communicated. Additionally, well-known and easily 
accessible shelters are not indicated on campus. These are significant impediments to efficient 
evacuation and overall safety when severe weather strikes. 
Recommended Results and Changes 
Surveillance Equipment 
A multitude of physical security equipment is needed throughout the venue in order for 
Carroll Stadium staff to protect against all potential threats. Both interior and exterior 
surveillance equipment is recommended. Given the stadium’s foundation of concrete and metal, 
we recommend installation of hard-wired cameras instead of the less reliable wireless systems. A 
better picture will be obtained with hard wired cameras, they are less likely to be hacked, and it 
is easier to record any video that is obtained. The NVR 900 8 Channel 2K Resolution Security 
System is specifically recommended. This indoor surveillance system features eight different 
security domes which can operate in regular or night vision mode (“NVR 8”, 2019). Each 
camera can see up to 125 feet in 2K clarity which is twice the resolution of 1080p HD. This 
indoor system easily connects with Lorex Systems Nocturnal 4K Ultra HD IP NVR System and 
with 16-Channel NVR and 8 Outdoor 4K (8MP) Metal Cameras. This comprehensive outdoor 
surveillance system features 16 cameras which are weatherproof, have 4X optical zoom, and 
have a 250-foot infrared night vision maximum range. These cameras also include microphones 
which allow for audio recording of events. Both of these surveillance systems are made by Lorex 
Technology ensuring flawless connectivity (“Lorex”, 2019). Both systems allow the user to 
record any video on a 3TB hard drive which can then be transferred to e-mail or the Cloud for 
easy sharing with police.   
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Metal Detectors 
Physical security detectors and a variety of additional detection devices are recommended 
for the inside of the stadium. A combination of metal detectors and explosive sniffing K9s is the 
best solution. Pedestrian traffic should be directed to the main entrances where metal detectors 
should be positioned. The Protocol MT 5500 is a detector that would simplify the flow of traffic 
and allow for changing of detection sensitivity (“Protocol”, 2019). This metal detector will 
indicate a general alarm location on the person making a follow up inspection easier. 
Simultaneously, a K9 and handlers’ presence will cover metal detector shortfalls. K9s will be 
able to sense traces of explosives missed by the detectors, stopping an incident before it happens. 
The K9 unit will also offer mobility in monitoring high traffic or suspicious areas. 
The last line of surveillance that we recommend is a drone. The Aeryon SkyRanger R60 
would provide a superior level of surveillance (“SkyRanger”, 2019). An aerial view can give the 
surveillance team an opportunity to monitor large groups or to follow a suspect without leaving 
their post. This drone can fly for up to 50 minutes in 40mph sustained winds and up to 55mph of 
gusting winds which is common in downtown Indianapolis. The R60 offers multiple cameras 
which feature long-range or infrared camera additions. The tracking system onboard 
automatically tracks a maximum of 10 targets up to 3 miles away while also calculating the 
target speed and heading (“SkyRanger”, 2019). All of this information is streamed and recorded 
in real time under a secure encrypted network. This drone is currently used in multiple armies 
across the world and by countless search and rescue teams. 
Mini-Marathon Suggestions 
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When preparing for the Mini Marathon there needs to be public safety personnel from 
each department involved in the planning. During the event there need to be specialized units 
from each department on standby. The IUPUI committee should also look into utilizing 
temporary/mobile video surveillance equipment so that the command center has an overview of 
what is happening on that area of the course. Anyone that is working the event needs to have a 
badge from the event signifying that they can help the public with any issues that arise. 
The area should be swept for bombs days in advance and the day of the marathon.  K9 
teams are the best resource for finding bomb materials. The K9 is able to search a larger area in 
an adequate amount of time when compared with multiple people searching with detection 
devices. There should be specific checkpoint areas for ingress and egress with metal/CBRN 
detectors for any foot traffic from the general public. To help with blocking the roads and traffic, 
IUPUI could use either a concrete security barrier or a public safety vehicle across the travel 
lanes so outside vehicles are unable to drive through the course. 
Barriers 
The pedestrian areas we identified as vulnerable to vehicular attacks were the gate 
entrances at New York St./Barnhill Dr. and New York St./Patterson St. Neither of these locations 
have any barrier to stop a vehicle attack. The best type of barrier for the school to purchase 
would be removable bollards since they are both economical and removable (“Truckstopper”, 
n.d.). The school can remove the bollards after events so that it is easier for maintenance 
personnel to drive vehicles into the stadium should the need arise. They can also be removed for 
emergency situations where personnel need to bring a vehicle into the stadium.    
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Another vulnerable location is pedestrian traffic at the corner of New York St./University 
Blvd. and New York St./Limestone St. One type of barrier that could be used at both of these 
locations would be a concrete planter (“Security”, n.d.). These are cost-effective, keep the 
aesthetics of the campus design, and promote safety for pedestrians. Another type of barrier that 
the school may want to employ are portable barriers that can be easily moved around the campus 
as needed. Examples of these include a resin molded hollow barrier that can be filled with water 
or sand (“Portable”, n.d.). Filling these would give extra strength to the barrier. This type of 
barrier is cost effective and easily moved. 
Weather Related Technology and Protocols 
In the event of severe weather, students, faculty, and spectators alike should be aware of 
current technologies and protocols to ensure their safety in Carroll Stadium. Entities like the 
State Fair and IUPUI should have well documented procedures and guidelines for dealing with 
severe weather threats in order to prevent tragedies such as the State Fair stage collapse in 2011. 
Roles and responsibilities in cases of severe weather threats should be well known by all staff 
ahead of time. Security staff at all levels should be well trained for situations requiring 
evacuation or sheltering due to severe weather emergencies. Decision makers would also benefit 
from more accurate and location specific weather services. More localized information on the 
straight-line winds that caused the State Fair stage collapse may have led to an evacuation that 
would have prevented death and injury. 
         There are currently multiple technologies to keep people as informed as possible about 
inclement weather. We recommend encouraging visitors to download free weather apps that will 
notify them of dangerous situations. For example, Accuweather is a free app that pushes weather 
alerts to one’s cell phone automatically. We also recommend that IUPUI utilize a service such as 
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Strategic Response Partners (SRP) which provides property specific, severe weather alerts, 
including those for smaller storms that can be missed (“Severe Weather”, n.d.). SRP collects raw 
data from all NWS radar stations as well as thousands of other weather monitors around the 
United States. SRP also employs former military meteorologists who have extensive experience 
in operational forecasting where extreme accuracy is necessary. The location specific 
information and alerts provided by this service could be useful in monitoring weather threats and 
responding appropriately. In the case of a weather threat at the stadium, we further recommend 
utilizing the PA system to inform visitors of the situation and including explicit directions to 
maintain safety. 
Evacuation Routes 
Michael Carroll stadium potentially has four major evacuation routes. Two are found on 
New York Street as the main entrance and exits on the Northeast and Northwest ends of the 
stadium. On the East end of the stadium, there is another exit as well as a tunnel to the 
Natatorium. Citizens can also evacuate South of Carroll Stadium by taking the White River Trail 
to the East or West. Each direct exit is located on a busy street. Sending evacuees in a single 
outlined direction may not be a realistic option but we do recommend that evacuation directs 
people away from New York Street to allow first responder access. 
If the weather is severe enough to elicit an evacuation, pedestrian and vehicular traffic are 
major concerns. We recommend evacuation through the tunnel underneath University Blvd 
leading into the Natatorium. Using the tunnel instead of crossing New York Street allows first 
responders to have optimal access to the area. If the crowd of people going into the tunnel takes 
too long or causes a blockage of the tunnel, citizens should cross University Blvd and enter the 
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Natatorium through the main entrance. The Natatorium is the closest structure that can provide 
shelter from the storm. 
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Case Study Three: Natatorium 
Introduction and Current Actions 
         The Indiana University Natatorium is a significant sports complex located on the 
southern edge of Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) campus. The 
construction of the Natatorium was completed in the summer of 1982. The IU Natatorium is the 
host of several iconic sporting events, including the NCAA Division 1 Swimming and Diving 
Championships, Olympic Diving Trials, Olympic Swimming Trials, IHSAA Swimming and 
Diving State Championships, and the USA Swimming World Championship Trials. These events 
draw thousands of people per year to the complex, creating a need for effective and extensive 
security measures. The IU Natatorium seats approximately 4,700 people, with the majority of 
pedestrian traffic entering through two doors, one at the east end of the building and one located 
at the west end. The entry points for pedestrian traffic create two choke points during the influx 
of spectators due to ticket personnel being unable to operate faster than the ingress of spectators. 
         The Natatorium is located on the southeast corner of New York Street and University 
Boulevard and is in close proximity to a majority of the vehicular traffic that travels through 
campus. Parking at the Natatorium is simple because most of the traffic will enter off Blake 
Street to the east of the building and park in the Sports Garage or the Riverwalk Garage, and then 
spectators will enter through the east doors. The Natatorium presents many security concerns that 
must be addressed to ensure the safety of visitors and athletes. 
Situation 
Natural Disasters 
A THREAT ASSESSMENT AND SECURITY ANALYSIS 45 
 
Tornadoes and Straight-line Wind: Accuweather describes a tornado as a high-speed swirling 
column of air that travels across the ground and damages a fraction of the area that a 
thunderstorm affects (Sosnowski, 2019).  Straight-line winds are a microburst defined as “a 
strong downdraft in a thunderstorm that accelerates as it nears the ground” (Sosnowski, 2019).  
Straight-line winds have a broader range of damage than tornadoes but are usually less severe in 
terms of wind speed.  Microbursts occur before the thunderstorm system hits an area. The most 
dangerous microbursts can reach up to 100 mph (Sosnowski, 2019).  Micros bursts may not be as 
familiar to the public as tornadoes, but they can be very dangerous to structures not equipped to 
handle a sudden gust of air. 
         The Natatorium can be considered a large shelter for severe weather events.  Recent 
renovations added reinforced concrete to the exterior walls (Attwood, 2016). The Natatorium’s 
pool, weight room, and locker rooms are built into the ground and provide shelter from tornadoes 
and straight-line winds.  Areas above ground, such as the Jungle, and classrooms can 
accommodate hundreds more people in the event of a weather-related emergency. These rooms 
are window free and are located right inside the east and west entrances.  
         Finally, the Natatorium is located near every sports venue on campus.  Spectators, 
students, and athletes can quickly access the Natatorium from New York Street and University 
Blvd.  It takes no more than 3-5 minutes of walking to get to the Natatorium from the Student 
Center, softball fields, and Carroll Stadium. This serves as a useful facility in regard to severe 
weather as it can shelter many people, including those attending nearby events at Carroll 
Stadium or NCAA Softball fields. 
Man-Made Disasters 
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Terrorist Vehicular Attack (TVA): Recent terrorist culture, propaganda, and leadership has 
begun to advocate using vehicles as weapons to attack civilian populations around the world 
(“Terrorist Attacks by Vehicle Fast Facts”, 2018). The call is being answered. In recent history, 
vehicles have been used as deadly weapons all around the world, including the United States, 
Canada, France, Germany, Sweden, Spain, and the United Kingdom (“Terrorist Attacks by 
Vehicle Fast Facts”, 2018). The close proximity of vehicles and pedestrians in cities and college 
campuses make vehicle ramming a particularly appealing tactic to inflict mass casualties. Due to 
the rising popularity of vehicular attacks and the tendency of terrorists to target sporting events 
and entertainment venues, the Natatorium is at elevated risk of experiencing a TVA situation. 
Active Shooter: Statistically in the past, guns have been the weapon of choice in the United 
States to inflict mass casualties (i.e. four or more people injured or killed); however, starting in 
2013, the definition of ‘mass killing’ changed to mean three or more people killed in a single 
event regardless of the weapon of choice (Ingraham, 2015, p. 2-3).  According to Klarevas 
(2016), “over 25 percent of all gun massacres in the past five decades have occurred since 2009”.  
Reducing the risk of this type of violence is best accomplished by employing preemptive 
measures. 
A combination of poorly designed physical environments, high-energy events, and poorly 
trained or inexperienced staff can increase the likelihood of spectator violence. It is important to 
recognize the characteristics of each venue, event, and available staff that may play a role in 
increasing fan aggression. No single characteristic of these elements guarantees that violence 
will or will not occur. This must all be taken into account to create a plan for an attack on the 
facility with the perpetrator utilizing a gun as his/her weapon of choice. 
Challenges and Issues 
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         The Natatorium presents a unique set of safety and security challenges due to its location 
in downtown Indianapolis and placement on a university campus. Safety and security are of the 
utmost importance due to the quantity of people that enter and exit the facility daily. One of the 
security challenges that currently exists for the facility is its openness to the public. The 
Natatorium has a skywalk that connects to the rest of IUPUI campus via the School of Education 
and Social Work building. 
The skywalk offers convenience to those on campus, but also creates opportunities for 
those with malicious intent. Being open to the public allows for people to come and go as they 
please and creates more opportunity for an attack such as a suspicious package, Improvised 
Explosive Device (IED), or chemical/biological material dispersal. To improve safety and 
security of the skywalk, the doors that give immediate access to campus should remained locked 
and only accessible with a student ID and PIN. Access using a student ID and PIN will also 
allow for better tracking of those entering and exiting the facility. This technology would prove 
beneficial in deterring offenders from committing crimes because they would know they are 
being tracked. The use of identification and badges would also serve to prevent anyone who is 
not supposed to be in the facility from gaining access. 
         The location of the Natatorium also presents a challenge because there are several 
parking garages nearby, the skywalk connects the building to the rest of the campus, the library 
and Military Park are nearby, and downtown Indianapolis hotels are within walking distance. If 
someone wanted to plant an IED or chemical, radiological, or biological dispersal device they 
could then blend in with the rest of campus and escape into the city. This means security cameras 
should be strategically placed along the perimeter of the building to allow for a clear view of 
identified hot spots on campus. Hot spots can include entrances, exits, parking garages, and areas 
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that gather large crowds. The cameras should pan and allow the operator to zoom in on an 
individual and still retain a clear picture. 
         Another challenge that the Natatorium experiences is the age of the building. The 
renovations in 2016 offered many improvements to the building, including lighting upgrades, but 
much more can still be done. The main renovations conducted were to enhance the interior 
design of the Natatorium, along with other improvements to ensure that the facility remains a 
nationally renowned world-class destination for aquatics (“IUPUI”, 2018). Other improvements 
that would benefit the facility include additional surveillance equipment throughout the interior 
and exterior of the building, increased lighting along the perimeter of the building, and security 
improvements for the skywalk. 
Recommended Results and Changes 
         A diverse selection of improvements could be implemented to the Natatorium, ranging 
from technology and safety techniques to equipment and tactics to enhance the overall security 
for events. The initial changes would begin outdoors before entrance into the building. Vehicles 
have often been used by terrorists to target large crowds, cause damage, take lives, and inflict 
terror. To assist in the deterrence of these offenses, permanent security bollards should be 
installed near the main doors of the Natatorium on University Blvd. A study conducted at Penn 
State revealed that an individual security bollard can stop and destroy an attacking vehicle 
weighing 10,000 pounds that is moving at a rate of 65 mph or a 20,000-pound vehicle that 
is  moving at a rate of 46 mph (Hamm, 2017). Removable concrete barriers are another option 
for short-term road closures, but security bollards provide the best deterrent results. 
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         Combining the presence of law enforcement officers, modern technology, and third-party 
security would make checkpoints in the entryway can become much more effective. Metal 
detectors, cameras, and magnetic wands handled by security staff will increase the effectiveness 
of monitoring devices. All civilians will be required to walk through the scanners and have their 
bag inspected by security. If they refuse to cooperate, then they will be denied access to the 
event. Bags should be inspected to prevent possible hidden detonation devices or weapons. 
         There must be communication between multiple jurisdictions for future success. The 
Natatorium has a variety of entrances throughout the building, including underground tunnels, 
glass walkways, parking garages, basement level doors, the main entrance, and a few entrances 
on the side loading area of the building. Using joint communication and combined manpower all 
doors should be monitored throughout every event and only the main entrance should allow 
visitors access to the Natatorium. Security personnel also need to conduct routine patrols around 
the interior and exterior of the building. Implementing a mixture of tactics, modern technology, 
and security techniques will best prevent a possible attack. 
         Venue security can be enhanced by creating a secure perimeter and maintaining a secure 
environment for the duration of the event. In developing these strategies it is critical to anticipate 
the worst-case scenarios in order to formulate a security and risk management strategy. Utilizing 
this process will assist in creating appropriate modifications to security, training, organization, 
personnel screening, and surveillance during the event. 
         All event security stakeholder should train for emergencies as one team under the 
Incident Command Structure (ICS), which should be utilized during the event. All law 
enforcement, fire, emergency medical services, and private security organizations should be 
coordinated under a single unified command to enhance communication and the ability for all 
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agencies to act as one cohesive entity. Officials within the unified command structure should 
take note of past mistakes relating to discoordination with too many delegations of authority and 
responsibility that generate a lack of fluent communication and undermine the command 
structure (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017). This can be completed in a After Action Review 
(AAR) which gathers all entities to discuss the successes and failures of response during an 
event. 
          Training should be conducted to minimize the risk of complacency within the security 
apparatus. Complacency creates a false sense of security. To reduce complacency, tactile 
exercises and real-life scenarios should be implemented during planning to establish the 
practicality of a plan and highlight any shortcomings (Hall, 2006). 
         Visitor screening at the event perimeter and security checkpoints can be enhanced 
through the use of modern screening technology, including metal detectors, bomb detection, and 
drones. In order for this technology to be effective, the Natatorium’s multiple entrances must be 
secured and the points of entry reduced to include only those with security checkpoints. Each 
checkpoint will require any individual entering the venue to pass through a walk-through metal 
detector to check for firearms, knives, and any other metallic object that is capable of being used 
as a weapon. 
         Explosive detection K-9 teams can be employed at security checkpoints to screen 
individuals and bags entering the facility. These teams can also be used within the venue to 
check for any explosive devices hidden within the facility prior to security establishing a 
perimeter. Finally, these teams would sweep any type of freight or other deliveries brought in by 
outside vendors prior to and during the event. 
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         Drones can be used to supplement manpower both inside and outside of the venue. A 
single drone can circle above the site and provide incident command with a birds-eye view of the 
perimeter and enhance the ability to monitor crowds and rapidly gather intelligence on any 
emerging threats. Inside the building, smaller drones can be used to provide roaming 
surveillance. 
Conclusion 
The IU Natatorium is more prepared for natural disasters than it is for potential terrorist attacks. 
Without the ability to delve into more IUPUI plans and policies, it is difficult to fully assess how 
the facility can respond during these events. This security analysis provides an overview of 
potential problems and solutions with the Natatorium and provides a detailed account of the 
vulnerability of this facility during large events. The building is reinforced in the event of a 
severe weather threat, but there could be many improvements made when planning for a 
potential human-made threat. 
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